In this paper we propose a new method to detect relay attacks. The relay attacks are possible in many communication systems, and are easy to put in practice since the attackers don't require any knowledge about the underlying protocols or the cryptographic keys.
Introduction
Many systems are vulnerable to a relay attack, where an adversary can forward data, even encrypted, between two communicating parties in order to obtain some benefits (e.g. money or access to a building). Several solutions have been proposed to solve this problem, of which we mention distance bounding and multichannel protocols. These methods require precise time measurement or extra communication channels, respectively.
We offer a new approach to detect relay attacks that does not rely on distance bounding and which is distinct from multichannel protocols (though vaguely related). Our approach relies on creating a kind of hop-count metric based on introducing noise in the channel.
We suggest two possible physical implementations of the approach and discuss their advantages and limitations.
The Relay Attack Problem
A relay attack can be imagined as the extension (or even conception) of the communication channel between Alice and Bob without their knowledge.
The goal of the attacker is to relay the information between Alice and Bob in order to get some illegitimate benefit, even if the communication channel is encrypted.
These attacks can be carried out against most of the existing communication systems, where two parties (Alice and Bob) cannot control the entire communication channel between them. One of the first descriptions of the relay attack was made by Conway [1] , referring to a little girl who played chess simultaneously against two Chess Grandmasters. She had to relay the moves from one of the Grandmasters to the other, so that in the end she either won against one of them or drew against both.
As a practical example, think about the situation where Alice is an ATM and Bob is a bank debit card. An attacker can try to mount the following attack to get money from Bob's account. Firstly the attacker creates a fake ATM, which we name MalvAlice (MA). Then he uses a fake card, named MalBob (MB), connected to MalvAlice. Now all the attacker has to do is to convince the possessor of the debit card to insert Bob into MalvAlice. At this point the attacker inserts MalBob into the real ATM, Alice, and relays the communication between Bob and Alice. Both Alice and Bob believe they are communicating directly since they are receiving the correct information; this works even if the data is encrypted, since the only goal of the attacker is to transfer the data between the two parties. At the end the real ATM happily gives the money to MalBob and MalvAlice simply outputs an error message to Bob. A graphical representation is shown in figure 1. Some solutions have been proposed to solve this problem, among which we mention distance-bounding protocols [3] and multichannel protocols [6] . The details and differences of these methods compared to our solution are discussed later in the paper, but for now we mention that in this paper we describe a new method to detect relay attacks.
In the following section we describe our idea for detecting a relay attack in a novel way.
